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"We want your money, not your two cents." -Joe Paterno

INTRODUCTION

On January 20, 2011, the University of Connecticut's ("UConn") athletic department
received a scathing letter from major donor Robert Burton. 1 Burton, a highly successful printing
industry executive, has donated over $7 million to support both academic and athletic programs
2

at the University. A former college football player and NFL draft pick, Bln1on shares a love of
football with his three sons, one of whom served as team captain for the Huskies in 1999. 3
While he has contributed to UConn academics by establishing two endowed scholarship :ftmds, it
was Burton's $2.5 million gift towards the construction of a new $50 million on-campus football

1

The portions of Burton's January 19,2011 letter to former UConn athletic director Jeff Hathaway that are of
particular relevance to this Note read:
''[A]s the largest donor in the UConn football program .. .I told you that I wanted to be involved in
the hiring process for the new coach. I also gave you my insight about who would be a good fit for the
head coaching position as well as who would not ... For someone who has given over $7,000,000 to the
football program/university, I do not feel as though these requests were asking for too much ... To be crystal
clear, I was not looking for veto power over the next hire; I just wanted to be kept in the loop and add value
and comments on any prospective candidates ... You and your committee of three talked to some coaches
and made a critical decision about who you were going to hire without input from knowledgeable people
who care about the program ... You do not have the skills to manage and cultivate new donors or the ability
to work with coaches .. .I did not graduate from UConn, but my son Mike and his wife are UConn grads,
and UConn did give me an honorary PhD .. .I earned my voice on this subject as your number one football
donor/supporter, by naming the Burton Family Football Complex and by giving millions of dollars in
scholarship money to UConn's football players and its Business School.. .I supported [the former coach's]
football camp as a sponsor and gave thousands of dollars for additional requests for things like artwork at
the football complex and an audio system for the player's weight room ... I am fully qualified to assess
coaches and their ability to match up with the university's needs, and I have done so for footba11 programs
from Vanderbilt to New Haven, as well as several schools in the Ohio Valley Conference and [the] Big
Ten ... After this slap in the face and embarrassment to my family, we are so upset that we are out of
UConn ... What that means is that we do not want to deal with people like you and your committee, who we
do not trust and cannot count on to make the correct decisions or do anything right with our money ... We
want our money and respect back ... Over the past years, the Burton family has donated over $31 million to
support special education and scholarship programs in America .. .It is a shame that UConn will not be on
our list going forward." Letter from Robert Burton to Jeffrey Hathaway (Jan. 19, 2011), available at
http://www.ctpost.com/sports/item/Bw1on-s-letter-to-UConn-3855.php [hereinafter Burton letter].
2
Neil Vigdor and Rob Varnon, UConn booster Burton: Hit man with a heart- and a football addiction, CONN.
POST, Feb. 1, 2011, available at http://www.ctpost.com/locaVarticle/UConn-booster-Burton-Hit-man-with-a-heartand-989760.php - page-1.
3
I d. As a sh1dent, Burton was the recipient of a full scholarship from his alma mater, Murray State University in
Kentucky. He was captain of the Murray State football team, a four-year first team stm1er, and an All-American
selection in his senior year. After graduating, he was a 19th-round selection of the San Francisco 49ers and later
signed with the Buffalo Bills.
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complex in 2002 that helped launch the program into Division IA, and earned Burton recognition
as UConn's most valuable booster.

4

Yet just nine years later, in 2011, on the heels of the most

successful season in UConn football's history, Robert Burton asked for his money back. 5
A booster like Robert Burton is every college athletic program's dream. In 2006, only 19
of the 119 total universities in the Football Bowl Subdivision netted an actual profit from their
respective programs.

6

As an average, from 2004 to 2006, just 16 broke even. 7 With the vast

majority ending their seasons in the red, philanthropy has become vital to the success and
prestige of college athletic programs. Booster dollars translate to state-of-the-art facilities, topof-the-line equipment, and creatn-of-the-crop recn1its.

This recipe for athletic success often

spills over onto the university's plate as well, as schools reap notable benefits from sports-drawn
media attention.

8

In this age of high-profile Division I football and basketball, where

professional-like stakes continue to erode the amateurism of decades past, athletic departments
feel pressure when it cotnes to cultivating- and nurturing- relationships with major donors. 9
And as the Burton letter demonstrates, hell hath no fury like a booster scorned. When
UConn's athletic department was seeking to fill the shoes of departing head football coach
Randy Edsall in early 2011, and Burton was not consulted, he ignited a feud with UConn athletic
director Jeff Hathaway that garnered national media coverage. As copies of the very expressive

!d.
!d.
6
See MATTHEW DENHART ET AL., CTR. FOR COLLEGE AFFORDABILITY AND PRODUCTIVITY, THE ACADEMICS
ATHLETICS TRADE-OFF (2009), available at http://www.centerforcollegeaffordability.org/uploads/athletics.pdf.
7
ld
8
For example, after Northwestern University's appearance in the 1996 Rose Bowl, the University boasted a 30%
increase in applications for the upcoming academic year.Jd. at 6.
9
The Knight Foundation Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics, established with the purpose of identifYing ways
to prevent athletic programs from interfering with the academic integrity of American institutions, referred to the
growing competition between colleges for the acquisition of resources as an "arms race." See KNIGHT FOUND.
COMM'N ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, A CALL TO ACTION: RECONNECTING COLLEGE SPORTS AND HIGHER
EDUCATION (2001); James P. Strode, Donor Motives to Giving to Intercollegiate Athletics 1-2 (2006) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, the Ohio State University), available at
http://etd.ohiolink.edu/sendpdf.cgi/Strode%20James%20Patrick.pdf?osu1148304953 [hereinafter "Strode"].
4

5
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letter were leaked to the press, Burton was pegged as ... well, a prima donor. But are multimillion dollar boosters like Robert Burton justified in their expectation of control and influence
over a collegiate athletic program?
Pati I of this Note will discuss the vital role boosters play in college athletics, and will

explain why colleges, universities and other non-profit organizations have increasingly relied
upon the generosity of donors in recent years. Additionally, this section will explore the various
motives that drive philanthropic giving, specifically· focusing on how power, control and
influence may motivate major donors in college sports.
Part II will redirect towards a discussion of the traditional legal relationships and
conflicts arising between donors and institutions, and will stress the importance of clear donative
intent in gift agreements. This section will also deconstruct the common law barrier to donor
standing- an obstacle that historically prevented the merits of many donor-initiated claims from
being heard and resolved.
Part III will introduce the emerging phenomenon of venture philanthropy, a departure
fron1 1nore traditional methods of charitable giving which affords donors the ability to manage
and oversee their funds. It will include an analysis of Smithers v. St. Luke 's/Roosevelt Hospital,
a landmark case for donor standing, specifically focusing on what constitutes a "special interest"
in a charitable organization.
Finally, this Note will compare and contrast collegiate boosters like Robert Burton with
venture philanthropists and other donors who reserve managerial rights for themselves when
conferring gifts to institutions. It will conclude by finding that, despite the growing need for
financial assistance from donors in collegiate athletics, accepting certain restricted gifts - those

5
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with considerably tight strings attached - may only serve to further erode the integrity and
amateurism of the NCAA.

I. Modern Donors: The Trend Towards Control

Due to our nation's current economic climate, American tmiversities, charitable
foundations and other non-profit entities have experienced a significant decline in funding from
state and local govermnents. 10 In response to the downturn, these institutions have been forced
to seek alternative financial resources. 11 College athletic departments are especially susceptible
to the sting of inadequate funding, as the expenses of the majority of college sports programs
substantially outweigh revenues. 12 Approximately 75% of NCAA Division I programs lose
money annually, while the expenses necessary to maintain competitiveness continue to increase
each year. 13 To close the funding gap, athletic departments have increasingly relied upon
philanthropic giving. 14 For instance, in 1965, donations from boosters accounted for 5o/o of
athletic revenues. But today, donors contribute nearly 20%. 15
Soliciting contributions from donors has become vital to the success and sustainability of
not only college athletic progratns, but charities and non-profits as well.

As such, these

institutions continually strive to understand the psychology of philanthropic giving.
Philanthropy as we understand it today is a relatively new concept. In the United States, the
practice emerged and developed in the 20th century with the establishment of private
foundations by industrial giants like Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller. 16 Yet these champions of

10

Strode, supra note 9, at 1.
Jd.
12 ld.
13 ld.
14 ld.
15 !d.
16
See Alan F. Rothchild, Jr., How Donors May- and May Not-Exercise Control ofCharitable Gifts, 16
TXNEXEMPT 110 (2004) [hereinafter Rothchild].
11

6

BUYING INFLUENCE IN COLLEGE ATHLETICS: HOW MUCH DOES IT COST TO PUT IN YOUR TWO CENTS?
Amanda Leone

industry did ·not give with both hands - rather, wealthy donors traditionally utilized private
foundations as a means of retaining control over their charitable gifts. 17 In lieu of donating
assets directly to an institution or organization, establishing a private foundation afforded donors
the ability to oversee the management and distribution of their ftmds. 18 Though the practice and
advent of philanthropy in our society is far more widespread than it was during Rockefeller's
time, donors of the 21st century are becoming increasingly demanding with respect to control
and management of their gifts. 19 In the view of one commentator, "society has moved and is
continuing to move toward a results-oriented, quasi-commercial, social engineer's conception of
charity."20
To gain perspective on why this attitudinal shift in philanthropy has occurred, and
perhaps begin to understand UConn football booster Robert Burton's outrage, it is helpful to
examine the theories behind why people give in the first place. In recent decades, numerous
studies have been conducted to measure donor motivation. 21 Specifically, "[t]he instruments
developed by sport researchers have focused on a range of motives for giving, from psychosocial
constructs such as feelings of loyalty to tangible benefits such as preferential seating for football
games. " 22 A 2006 study conducted at a large, football-oriented Midwestern university developed
a model that narrowed the range of athletic booster motives to just four: achievement, affiliation,

ld.
Jd.
19 Jd.
17

18

20

This social shift reflects the quasi-professional shift that has occurred in collegiate athletics. Programs are
becoming increasingly "results-oriented," and many commentators argue that big-time Division I football and men's
basketball programs are teetering on the verge of commercialization.
21
See, e.g., J.E. BILLING ET. AL., ATHLETIC FUND-RAISING: EXPLORING THE MOTIVES BEHIND DONATIONS (1985);
E.J. Staurowsky, B. Parkhouse, and M. Sachs, Developing An Instrument to Measure Athletic Donor Behavior and
Motivation, 10 J. SPORT MANAGEMENT 262, 262-277 (1996); J.M. Gladden et. al., Toward a Better Understanding
of College Athletic Donors: What Are the Primary Motives? 14(1) SPORT MARKETING Q. 18, '18-30 (2005)
[hereinafter "Gladden"].
22
Strode, supra note 9, at 33.
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philanthropy, and power.

23

According to the study's results, achievement ranked the highest

among the four, leading the researchers to conclude that "donors give money in an effort to
fulfill vicarious triumphs concurrent with successful athletic squads."24 Affiliation, which links
charitable giving with a donor's sense of belonging, came in second place? 5 The philanthropy
motive, which sought to measure the number of donors giving without expecting something in
return, ranked third. 26 Power ranked last among the four motives, suggesting that at this
particular university, the donors surveyed did not have an especially strong expectation of a quid
pro quo relationship with the institution? 7
This finding, that power ranks lowest among donor motives 1n college athletics, is
s01nething of an anomaly. Despite its low ranking, researchers and analysts studying donor
motivation do not discotmt power as a viable "hidden" motive. Because the majority of research
conducted on donor motivation relies upon the honesty of respondents, it is reasonable that the
stigma attached to the "desire for power" deters participants from speaking truthfully? 8 "[I]t
may be viewed as faux pas to divulge the reason for engaging in philanthropic behavior is to gain
power. People may wish to think that their gift is an altruistic gesture, rather than a selfish act
for personal gain." 29 Other studies on philanthropic motivation support the theory that great
contribution and great expectation go hand-in-hand.

Research conducted by the Center on

Philanthropy at Indiana University concluded that, while motives for giving are consistent along
the economic spectrum from poor to wealthy, when major donors contribute 1najor dollars
toward a purpose of their choice, "they invariably want to shape rather than merely support" that

23

See generally, Gladden, supra note 21.
Strode, supra note 9, at 82.
25
Jd. at 83.
26
ld. at 84.
27 ld.
28
ld. at 85.
29 /d.
24
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cause. 30
Ample evidence from the world of college sports, including the Burton letter, supports the
hypothesis that some donors give to athletic programs with an tmspoken expectation of access
and influence. When that agenda is exposed, however, donors and institutions alike may feel
repercussions - be they mere disapproving jeers from the sports community, or full-scale
sanctions from the NCAA. In 2005, Logan Yotmg, an athletics booster at the University of
Alabama was convicted of bribery in federal court for using his financial influence to seek out
top high school recn1its for the University. 31 Most recently, and most notoriously, former
University of Miami football booster Nevin Shapiro allegedly doled out thousands of proscribed
benefits to at least 72 Miami football players from 2002 through 2010. 32 It is wholly plausible
that the stigma created by these public scandals involving illicit boosters would deter an average
donor from admitting even their slightest expectation of access and influence. Nevertheless, as
evidenced by both research and real-world prototypes, the power motive is not to be discounted.
Yet not all power-thirsty donors cause headaches for their respective institutions and the
NCAA. In fact, quid pro quo donations in college sports are not unheard of. Many athletics
booster clubs have developed some sort of progressive scale of dollar amounts, guaranteeing
perks like special seating, tickets, or even an invitation to the team banquet at the end of the
season in exchange for a specified donation amount. But what dollar amount actually buys a
donor influence over the program?
30

Paul G. Schervish, lvfajor Donors, lvfajor Motives: The People and Purposes Behind Major Gifts, in 16 NEW
DIRECTIONS FOR PHILANTHROPIC GIVING 85, 86 (Dwight F. Burlingame, Timothy L. Seiler, Eugene R. Tempel eds.,
1997), available at http://www.bc.edu/contentldam/files/research_sites/cwp/pd£'majordonors.pdf.
31
Strode, supra note 10, at 84.
32
The numerous benefits Shapiro provided to players at the University of Miami included "cash, jewelry, prostitutes,
parties in his mansions and on his yacht, elaborate meals and nights out at expensive nightclubs and strip bars,
bonuses for athlete's play on the field, special bonuses for injuring players on another team, and, in one instance, an
abortion for a stripper a player had impregnated." U. of Miami's 'Booster Bombshell': 'The Craziest Scandal in
NCAA HistOJy', THE WEEK (Aug. 19,2011,1:13 PM), http://theweek.com/article/index/218426/u-of-miamisbooster-bom bsh ell-the-craziest-scandal-in-ncaa-history.
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II. Donor vs. Institution: Legal Relationships and Disputes
Typically, the process of making a major gift to a college, university, or other non-profit
organization does not merely consist of writing, signing and handing over a multi-million dollar
check. Accounting for the institution's needs as well as the donor's preference, gifts may be
either designated for a specific purpose or unrestricted, given without any strings attached and
available to use as the institution sees fit. 33 Often, when a donor decides to make a major
financial contribution, he intends the gift to be used for a specific purpose. 34 A donor is free to
dictate his own specific purpose for a gift, such as the construction of a new building, support for
a particular program, or whatever else he chooses. 35 However, the institution is not required to
accept a restricted gift that it does not intend to honor. 36 "[I]n practice most major gifts are
negotiated agreements between the donor and the nonprofit's executive or board leadership."37
Institutions recognize the importance of discussing gift restrictions with major donors prior to
accepting their contributions, and the necessity of preserving the terms in a written gift
instrument to avoid future mistmderstandings. 38
Under the Restatement of Property, donor intent is the paramotmt consideration when
interpreting a gift instrument. 39 The provisions a donor chooses to include in a gift agreement
are particularly valuable to the determination of a gift's identity, as remedies available to both
donor and donee are contingent upon a court's interpretation of the donative document. If a
donor chooses to give an unrestricted gift to an institution, it is presumed that the donor gives

33

JULIA

I. WALKER, NONPROFIT ESSENTIALS: MAJOR GIFTS 3 (2006).

34

I d. at 2.
35 ld.
36
!d. at 4.
37 ld.
38 ld.
39
Restatement (Third) of Property, § 10.1 (2003).
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with both hands and relinquishes all interest and control upon the gift's completion. 40 In contrast,
a trust is created when a donor manifests his will to create a fiduciary relationship between
himself and a trustee, and the donor subjects the trustee to a duty to use the trust for a stated
purpose.

41

Finally, if a donor chooses to attach express conditions to his gift, the donee's interest

may be subject to forfeiture or reversion in the event that the donee fails to meet the
requiren1ents or conditions set forth by the donor in the deed of gift. 42
When it is uncertain whether the provisions in a gift agreement create a trust or restricted
gift, courts generally favor an interpretation of the former over the latter. 43 As one court
explained, ''[b ]ecause forfeiture is a harsh remedy, any ambiguity is resolved against it." 44 In the
event that a condition is breached, however, the required legal remedy is forfeiture. 45 Thus,
where a document's language is ambiguous as to donor intent, courts opt to constnw the
instrument in a manner that will more effectively confer a benefit to the public. 46 However, if a
donor clearly manifests his intent to create a restricted gift, that intention will be honored. 47
In L. B. Research and Education Foundation v. UCLA Foundation, a California court
grappled with the question of whether a deed of gift constituted a charitable trust or restricted
gift. 48 In that case, a donor had contributed $1 million to UCLA for the establishment of an

40

The Law Of Tmsts And Tn1stees § 324.
!d.
42 !d.
43 !d.
44
L.B. Research & Educ. Found. v. UCLA Found., 130 Cal. App. 4th 171, 178 (2005).
45
The Law Of Tmsts And Tmstees § 324 ("Courts of equity are hostile to conditions and the harsh forfeitures which
they involve.").
46 !d.
47
I d. at 178; While the law requires that courts utilize a donor's intention as their compass in determining the
meaning of a deed of gift, there is dissention among courts and commentators over the extent to which outside
documents and testimony, i.e., extrinsic evidence, may be used to ascertain the donor's intention. The majority
fosters the "plain meaning nlle," which prohibits extrinsic evidence from being introduced to contradict the plain
meaning of the instmment's words.
48
L.B. Research, 130 Cal. App. 4th at 171.
41
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endowed chair at UCLA's medical school. 49 When the plaintiff Foundation felt that the
conditions attached to the gift had been ignored, it filed suit against the University and demanded
that the ftmds be transferred to the University of California, San Francisco, School of
Medicine.

50

Upon UCLA's motion for dismissal, the court was forced to delineate the

differences between a charitable trust and a conditional gift in order to rule on the motion. 5 1
Citing the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, the court defined "charitable tn1st" as the
intentional creation of a fiduciary relationship between donor and trustee, and identified intent,
trust res, and charitable purpose as the elements necessary for its creation. 52 It went on to
contrast that definition with elements for the establishment of a restricted gift: "The gift will be
construed as one of a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent if it is expressly provided in
the instrument that the transferee shall forfeit it or that the transferor or his heir or a third party
person n1ay enter for breach of the condition. " 53
In rendering its decision and ascertaining the intent of the parties, the court was required
to rely upon the "writing as a whole" and concluded that the instrument indeed conferred a
restricted gift. 54 According to the court, the writing demonstrated an intent that the fund revert to
a contingent donee in the event that UCLA did not use it for its designated purpose. 55 The court
concluded that L.B. Research intended to impose an enforceable obligation on UCLA to use the

49

Jd. at 175.
I d. at 176-77 (' 1 [T]he UCLA Foundation and the Regents had failed to employ personnel meeting the criteria of
the Chair; failed to account to L.B. Research; offered the Chair to non-qualified individuals and, over the objection
of L.B. Research and the Attorney General of the State of California, elected an unqualified person to the Chair;
withdrawn unearned fees from the Chair's ftmd; and refused to deliver the Chair's fund to the Department of Surgery
at the University of California, San Francisco, School of Medicine.").
50

ld.
I d. at 177.
53
!d. at 178; Restatement (Second) ofTmsts § 11.
54
L.B. Research, 130 Cal.App 4th at 179.
51
52

55

ld.
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money in accordance with the stated conditions.

56

The University contested, however, that

because the gift agreement did not contain an express forfeiture provision, it could not be
construed as a restricted gift. 57 The court responded by noting that, although UCLA's failure to
abide by the conditions outlined in the gift agreement would not necessarily constitute a
forfeiture for the "entire University of California system", 58 it would nevertheless constitute a
forfeiture for UCLA's medical school, the institution specifically designated by the Foundation
as the donee.

59

As L.B. Research shows, the manner in which a court construes the language of a

gift instrument and interprets donative intent may significantly impact not only the re1nedies
available to a plaintiff donor, but, more importantly, whether the 1nerits of the donor's claim will
survive a defendant's motion to dismiss.
Though it seems to contradict the deference given to donor intent discussed in the
previous section, a donor lacks standing at common law to enforce the terms of a completed gift
unless he or she expressly reserves the right to do so. 60 This provision may appear in an
instrument as a right of reverter or a right to redirect. Thus, to effectively bring a private lawsuit
and reclaim his funds, hypothetically, Robert Burton's deed of gift to UConn would have had to
contain not only a provision reserving him the right to be consulted during the coach selection
process, but also a reversion. If a gift instrument does not contain such language, however, an
aggrieved donor's only hope for recourse rests with the attorney general, who, at common law,
has the authority to enforce the provisions of a donative instnlffient. 61

56

L.B. Research, 130 Cal.App. 4th at 179 (citing City of Palm Springs v. Living Desert Reserve, 70 Cal. App. 4th
613, 622 (1999)).
57

ld.

58

L.B. Research, 130 Cal. App. 4th at 179-80.

59

I d. at 180 ("Because UCLA's loss will be UC San Francisco's gain, the nature of this forfeiture supports rather

than defeats L.B. Research's position and does not require adoption of a view antagonistic to the donor's charitable
intent.").
60
Restatement (Second), Trusts § 348, comment (f), p. 212 (1959).
61
Restatement (Second), Trusts § 348.
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The power delegated to the attorney general to enforce charitable gifts stems from the
English common law notion of the Crown as parens patriae. 62 Historically, the Crown bore the
exclusive responsibility to "facili[tate] the alleviation of suffering among its most vulnerable
subjects," and, as an agent for the Crown, the attorney general was burdened with the duty of
enforcing charitable gifts. 63 This state interest in the enforcement of charitable funds resonates
today, as the common law remains an important source of authority for state attorneys general to
enforce donor intent. 64 "Where property is given to a charitable corporation and it is directed by
the terms of the gift to devote the property to a particular one of its purposes, it is under a duty,
enforceable at the suit of the Attorney General, to devote the property to that purpose." 65
In recent decades, however, the attorney general's role in the enforcement of charitable
gifts has been criticized as antiquated and inadequate. 66 The offices of attorneys general are
notoriously understaffed and tmderftmded, and the duties of this public official extend far beyond
mere oversight of charitable gifts. 67 But while the expansion of individual standing to bring
enforcement suits would potentially alleviate this problem, cotuis have been reluctant to grant
standing to private parties for fear of unnecessary lawsuits that would likely drain charitable
assets. 68 Because public benefit is the essence of a public charity, it is rational to conclude that
these organizations "must be protected from harassment and loss. " 69 Thus, courts have been
wary to open their doors to private parties who lack a tangible stal<:e in the charitable property.

62

70

Iris J. Goodwin, Donor Standing to Enforce Charitable Gifts: Civil Society Vs. Donor Empowerment, 58 VAND. L.
REV. 1093, 1136 (2005) [hereinafter Goodwin].
63 ld.
64
Jd.; Restatement (Second), Trusts§ 391.
65
Restatement (Second), Trusts § 348.
66
Goodwin, supra note 62, at 1138.
67
Jd. at 1139.
68
Alco Gravure, Inc. v. Knapp Found., 479 N.E.2d 752, 756 (N.Y. 1985).
69
Goodwin, supra note 62, at 1140.
70 ld.
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Some state coutis, however, have opted to relax standing requirements as they pertain to
beneficiaries of a charitable trust or gift on a subjective basis by implementing the special
interest doctrine.

71

A court may invoke the special interest doctrine to determine whether a

plaintiffs affiliation with a charity entitles him to standing. 72 Factors weighed by the court
include: the act(s) spurring the cause of action, the remedy sought by the plaintiff, fraud or
n1isconduct by the charity or its directors, the nature of the benefitted class and its relationship to
the charity, and the attorney general's availability or effectiveness. 73
Had the court in L.B. Research and Education Foundation v. UCLA Foundation
interpreted the donative instnlll1ent as a tn1st rather than a restricted gift, the Foundation's
opportunity for judicial remedy would have been diminished- at least in some capacity. The
Foundation would have been required to conjure some additional arguments and justifications to
establish its standing without the aid of the attorney general. The court actually presented those
would-be arguments sua sponte, and determined that even if the language of the donative
docllll1ent were read to construct a charitable tn1st, the Foundation would nonetheless be entitled
to individual standing to sue because it satisfied the qualifications of an interested party. 74
Conceptually, a lawsuit brought by a party that demonstrates the requisite special interest in an
institution's objectives is less likely to be frivolous. 75 For this reason, courts have become
increasingly comfotiable granting standing to beneficiaries and other interested parties who seek
"to uphold the best interests of the charity." 76 Despite this kink in the general nile, when it

71

!d. at 1141.
Restatement (Second), Tn1sts § 391.
73 !d.
74
L.B. Research, 130 Cal. App. 4th at 180.
75
/d. at 180-81.
76
Goodwin, supra note 62, at 1142, 1148 ("In the past, the courts automatically accorded [founders and endowers] a
power of 'visitation' to supervise their gifts once given, treating the reservation of visitorial power as inherent in the
endowing of a corporate charity. The early cases based the doctrine on the power every one has to dispose, direct,
and regulate his own property. Today, we do not recognize that property given by a donor to charity remains in any
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comes to donor-initiated suits, courts have, for the most part, elected to stick to the com1non law
decree that the attorney general is the designated enforcer of charitable gifts. 77 Moreover, state
legislatures typically have refused to afford statutory relief to individual donors vexed by the
standing problem. 78
Prior to the creation of a concise set of uniform laws, an ambivalent mix of trust law,
corporate law and contract law governed disputes arising between donors and institutions. 79 The
inconsistent application of these doctrines, however, proved to be "disadvantageous for both the

°

donors and the charitable institutions receiving their gifts." 8 For instance, governing boards and
trustees typically enjoyed greater freedom under a corporate standard, but were confined to very
strict parameters under trust law. 81 As a result of these judicial inconsistencies, much of the
pertinent case law was reduced to "a series of seemingly disjointed cases that made it difficult for
goven1ing boards and their attorneys to predict judicial judgment. " 82
On the plaintiff donor's end, the odds of choosing a "winning" offensive strategy to
enforce the terms of his or her gift were equally dubious, and the problem was compounded by
the fact that ''donors did not have, and still do not have, standing to sue a charity for non-

sense 'his own.' Nevertheless, there was a rationale for allowing such rights. A founder had a natural reason to know
and care about the charity's operations. Also, permitting him to sue would not expose the charity to vexatious
litigation from indifferent members of the public.").
77
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 348 cmt. f. (''Where property is given to a charitable corporation and it is
directed by the tenus of the gift to devote the property to a particular one ofi1s purposes, it is under a duty,
enforceable at the suit of the Attorney General, to devote the property to that purpose."); But see L.B. Research and
Educ. Foundation v. UCLA Foundation, 130 Cal. App. 4th 171 (2005), where court deemed plaintiff donor was
entitled to standing as a responsible individual with a legitimate interest in the charitable trust.
78
Goodwin, supra note 62, at 1143; See, e.g., Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. Univ. of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995, 996
(1997).
79
Rachel M. Williams, Transitioningfrom UMJFA to UPMJFA: How the Promulgation of the Uniform Prudent
Management ofInstitutional Funds Act Will Affect Donor-Initiated Lawsuits Brought Against Colleges and
Universities, 37 J.C. & U.L. 201,205 (2010) [hereinafter Williams].
80 Id.
81
Douglas M. Salaway, UMIFA and a Model For Endowment Investing, 22 J.C. & U.L. 1045, 1064 (1996)
[hereinafter Salaway].
82
Id. at 1065.
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compliance with donor-imposed restrictions." 83 Despite the slim chance that a court would
actually hear the merits of their claims, many donors nevertheless turned to the courts for remedy
only to be dismissed for lack of standing. 84 And still, in the limited number of instances where a
donor was able to get a foot in the door and voice their grievances, it was the courts' tendency to
extend protection to the defendant institution. 85
To encourage uniformity and consistency in the governance of funds given by donors to
institutions, forty-eight states plus the District of Colu1nbia have adopted statutes based upon
regulations created and endorsed by the Uniform Law Commission. 86 The first unifonn law
constructed to guide the investment and management of charitable gifts, the Uniform
Management of Institutional Funds Act ("UMIFA"), was drafted in 1972. 87 UMIF A was
revolutionary in that it established, for the first time, '\miform and fundamental n1les for the
invest1nent of funds held by charitable institutions and the expenditure of :fi.mds donated as
'endowments' to those institutions."88
In an attempt to ameliorate conflicts between plaintiff donors and defendant institutions
regarding donative intent and gift restrictions, the Uniform Law Commission drafted UMIF A to

83

Williams, supra note 79, at 207; 2 Restatement (Second), Tn1sts § 348, comment (f), p. 212 (1959) ("Where
property is given to a charitable corporation and it is directed by the terms of the gift to devote the property to a
particular one of its purposes, it is under a duty, enforceable at the suit of the Attorney General, to devote the
property to that purpose.").
84
Williams, supra note 79, at 228 ("The most highly litigated issue seems to be whether there is donor standing to
bring a lawsuit to object to the use of funds or enforce a restriction.").
85
See Trs. of Dartmouth Coli. v. Quincy, 258 N.E.2d 745, 753 (Mass. 1970) (Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, Norfolk court refused to enforce a donor's gift restrictions despite the fact that the donor expressly
intended for those provisions to be mandatory); See also Wilbur v. Univ. ofVt., 270 A.2d 889 (Vt. 1970) (Supreme
Court of Vermont held that a university's violation of the terms of a gift agreement "(did] not entitle the settlor or
his successor to enforce" the restrictions outlined in the instrument).
86
The Uniform Law Commission "provides states with non-partisan, well-conceived and well-drafted legislation
that brings clarity and stability to critical areas of the law." Uniform Law Commission, http://
www.nccusl.org/Update/ (Oct. 11, 2011).
87
UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT (Nat'l Conference ofComm'rs on Unif. State Laws 1972).
88
Uniform Law Commission, History of UPMIFA and UMIFA,
http://upmifa.org/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=2&tabid=69 (Oct. 11, 2011 ).
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strike a balance between the interests of donors and institutions. 89 To accommodate charitable
institutions bestowed with gifts bearing impracticable provisions, UMIFA permitted the release

°

of donor-imposed restrictions in certain circumstances. 9 Conversely, to safeguard donor intent,
particular regulations imposed by UMIFA could be limited or even annulled by a written
agreement between the parties.

91

In general, however, the overarching aim of the Uniform Law

Com1nission in drafting UMIFA was to ensure that "funds held by charitable institutions [were]
1nanaged and used prudently and according to the donor's intentions without deterring the
operation of the charity or unduly restricting its ability to respond to changes in the world." 92
In 2006, the Uniform Law Commission gave UMIFA a facelift, revamping and updating
the laws governing the 1nanagement and investment of institutional funds by promulgating the
Unifonn Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act ("UPMIFA"). 93 While UPMIFA's
priinary goal is not dissimilar to UMIFA's, the new Act

~·modernized"

its predecessor in several

respects. 94 Notably, the 2006 revision sought to liberalize the conditions under which donorimposed restrictions can be modified by a charitable institution. Under the original provisions of
UMIF A, an institution was unable to rely upon the courts for legal modification or release of
donor-imposed restrictions. While a restriction can be modified or released by merely obtaining
written consent from the donor, in practice, "obtaining donor consent can be impossible, at worst,

89

Williams, supra note 79, at 208.
UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT§ 7 (Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws
1972).
91
See, e.g., UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT§§ 3, 4, 5 (Nat'l Conference ofComm'rs on Unif.
State Laws 1972); UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT§§ 3(a), 3(e), 4(a), 4(b) (Nat'l
Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws 2006). The UMIFA considered any writing that ~'establishes the terms
of the gift" to be an authoritative "gift instrument." UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT§ 1 cmt.
(Nat' I Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws 1972).
92
Williams, supra note 79, at 208.
93
2 Restatement (Second), Trusts§ 348, comment (f), p. 212 (1959).
94
Williams, supra note 79, at 208.
90
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or extremely burdensome, at least." 95 To rectify this matter, the Uniform Law Commission
chose to supplement UPMIFA's provisions with the trust doctrines of cy pres and equitable
deviation.

96

The incorporation of these doctrines was intended not only to broaden the scope of

judicial remedy available to institutions paralyzed by donor-imposed gift restrictions, but to
foster ~~an approach that favors modification over release to protect donor intent." 97
Yet despite the Uniform Laws' mutual missions to 1nitigate conflicts between donors and
institutions, in the years since its original enactment and its 2006 revitalization, donors have
rarely relied upon UMIF A or UPMIFA in bringing lawsuits against colleges and universities.
Rather, donors who actually see their claims survive to trial have reverted to more traditional
principles of contract law, trust law, or corporate law to back the substance of their suits. 98 The
use of these legal doctrines "precludes the use of UMIFA's principles of interpretation in any
way because contract, trust, or corporate law will be applied in a manner corresponding to the
parties' characterization of the case." 99 In the vast majority of cases, however, donors are unable
to advance the ball far enough to even utilize an offensive strategy. Lack of standing is an
aggrieved donor's most formidable opponent, and as a result, the substantive issues underlying a
donor's clailn for enforcement of the terms of a gift are rarely adjudicated. In order for the
merits of donor-initiated lawsuits to be heard and remedied, donors first must find a way to clear
95

I d. at 214.

96

UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT§ 6(c) (Nat'l Conference ofComm'rs on Unif.
State Laws 2006); JOEL C. DOBRIS ET AL., ESTATES AND TRUSTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 701 (3d ed.,
Foundation Press 2007) (1998) (Using cy pres, a court is able to modify, in some way, a donor's instruction on the
use or purpose of a gift. However, any modifications sought by an institution as to the purpose of a donor's gift
must be consistent with the donor's intent as articulated in the gift instrument. A court's decision to apply the
doctrine of cy pres in trust law is dependent upon the charitable institution's ability to demonstrate: (1) that the gift
was given "to a charitable organization for a charitable purpose"; (2) that it is "impossible, impractical or illegal to
carry out the donor's stated charitable purpose"; and (3) "that the donor had general charitable intent."); Williams,
supra note 79, at 217 ("Equitable deviation applies tmder virtually the same circumstances as cy pres, except that it
applies not to the purpose of a fund but to the means used to carry out that purpose.").
97
Susan N. Gary, Charities} Endowments} and Donor Intent: The Uniform Prudent Management ofInstitutional
Funds Act, 41 GA. L. REV. 1277, 1328 (2007) [hereinafter Gary].
98
99

ld.
I d. at 229.
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the hurdle of standing. As demonstrated by the Supreme Court of Connecticut's decision in Carl

J Herzog Foundation, Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, however, the Uniform Laws are of little
utility.
In 1997, the Supreme Court of Connecticut reaffirmed the preeminence of the common
law standard when it held that the Carl J. Herzog Foundation lacked standing to enforce the

°

terms of its $250,000 gift to the University of Bridgeport. 10 For some time prior to the cause of
action, the Carl J. Herzog Foundation (herein "Foundation") gave money to Bridgeport
University (herein "University") to provide merit-based scholarships to disadvantaged students
demonstrating an interest in the medical field. 101 On August 12, 1986, the Folmdation wrote a
letter to the University agreeing to participate in a "matching grant program" that essentially
extended their previously established donor-donee relationship. 102 In the letter, the Foundation
expressly outlined its intent that the fi..mds go to "disadvantaged students for medical related
education on a continuing basis." 103 Several weeks later, on September 9, 1986, the Foundation
received an acceptance letter from the University in which it agreed to a $250,000 grant match
anangement. 104
Over a period of two years, both parties fi..Ilfilled their respective obligations. 105 The
University raised the agreed-upon sum of $250,000, and the Folmdation matched it, paying
$144,000 in Jlme 1987 and $106,000 approximately one year later. 106 In accordance with the
Foundation's wishes, the grant money was used to provide scholarships to students enrolled in

10

°Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. Univ. of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995, 996 (1997).

101

Herzog Found., 699 A.2d at 996.
ld.
103 Jd.
104 Jd.
105 ld.
106 ld.
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the University's nursing program. 107 In June 1991, however, the University closed its nursing
school.

108

The Foundation filed suit against the University requesting a "temporary and

pennanent injunction [and] ordering the defendant to segregate from its general funds matching
grants totaling $250,000." 109 The Foundation also demanded an accounting for the fund and
insisted that it be reestablished in conformance with the purposes expressed in the original gift
instru1nent. 11 0 The complaint further asserted that if the University could not satisfy the terms of
the original agreement, the ftmds were to be redirected to the Bridgeport Area Foundation. 111
This case presents one of the rare examples where a plaintiff donor attempted to pre1nise
both the substance of its claim as well as its entitlement to standing on a state's adoption of
UMIF A. 112 In its complaint, the Foundation articulated its belief that the institutional funds had
been intennixed with University's general funds, and that the money was not being used in
accordance with the tenns of the gift instrument. 113 Following an initial dismissal of the
Foundation's suit at trial for lack of standing and the appellate court's subsequent reversal, the
Supreme Court of Connecticut was confronted with the task of determining whether the state
legislature, by adopting UMIFA, intended to arm charitable donors with standing to enforce the
terms of a completed gift when the gift instrument in question "contained no express reservation
of control over the disposition of the gift."

114

Reiterating the Restatement (Second) of Tn1sts and citing case law from an array of
jurisdictions, the Herzog court reaffirmed the com1non law principle that unless a donor
expressly retained a right of control expressed as a restricted gift, the attorney general was vested
107

Herzog Found., 699 A.2d at 996.
ld.
109 ld.
110 Jd.
111 Jd.
112
I d. (In this specific case, the Connecticut Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act, or "CUMIFA").
113
Herzog Found., 699 A.2d at 996.
114
Jd. at 997.
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with the exclusive authority to bring an action to remedy the mishandling of a trust. 115 The court
concluded that the Connecticut legislature did not intend for the Uniform Act to supplant the
common law. 116 Specifically, the court cited a comtnent authored by UMIFA's drafters, which
stated: "The donor has no right to enforce the restriction, no interest in the fund and no power to
change the beneficiary of the fund. He may only acquiesce in a lessening of a restriction already
in effect." 117 As such, the Foundation was denied standing.
Although donors sought to find relief in UMIFA and UPMIFA, the uniform laws have
been of little utility to aggrieved donors seeking to direct and control the use of a completed,
unrestricted gift. A plaintiff donor lacks standing at comtnon law to enforce the terms of a
completed gift unless he expressly reserves the right to do so in the gift instrument negotiated
-vvith the donee institution. Thus, to avoid conflicts regarding the terms of a gift agreetnent, it is
itnperative that before completing a donation, the terms and expectations of the gift are discussed
and settled by the parties. If an institution or organization willingly accepts a restricted gift,
however, they become legally obligated to enforce and abide by the terms of that gift. 118

III. Venture Philanthropy, Special Interests and a Breakthrough for Donor Standing

Despite the growing trend towards gift control and oversight, the law remains partial to
the brand of unconditional, no-strings-attached philanthropy. 119 This intersection - where a

115

!d. at 998.
!d. at 999-1000.
117
Id at 100 1.
116

118

Regardless of the amount, some restricted gifts are simply too cumbersome for institutions to accept. In 1907,
Swarthmore College received coal lands and mineral rights worth an estimated $1-$3 million from wealthy Quaker
AnnaT. Jeanes. At the time, Swarthmore's entire endowment was only worth $1 million. Ms. Jeanes conditioned
her gift, however, stating in her will that Swarthmore would only receive the land if the college permanently
"discontinue[ d] and abandon[ ed] all participation in intercollegiate athletics, sports and games." Unwilling to
sacrifice its athletic programs, Swarthmore refused the gift. Will Treece, The Football Controversy Through the
Ages, SWARTHMORE COLLEGE DAILY GAZETTE (Oct. 7, 2009), http:!/daily.swarthmore.edu/2009/10/07/athletics/.
119
Thomas Kelley, Rediscovering Vulgar Charity: A Historical Analysis ofAmerica's Tangled Nonprofit Law, 73
FORDI-IAM L. REV. 2437,2439 (2005).
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donor's desire for control meets the law's preference for unrestricted giving - has been a
breeding grotmd for legal battles. In spite of the law's persistent effort to foster the notion of
unrestricted philanthropic giving and stifle the growing interest in gift control and oversight,
donors and charitable foundations began seeking alternatives to conventional giving. "Venture
philanthropy" is a term used to describe private donors' and foundations' inclination in recent
years to adopt strategies and methods employed in the for-profit world.

120

Instead of

relinquishing control upon the co1npletion of a charitable gift, a venture philanthropist's
contribution to a non-profit organization may be premised on specific terms and conditions
agreed upon by the parties. 121 Often, the donor retains the ability to provide business advice to
the organization or serve in a managerial capacity. 122
In 1971, decades before the term "venture philanthropist" was coined, Brink Smithers
1nade a $1 0 million gift to Roosevelt Hospital 123 in New York City for the establislunent of an
alcohol rehabilitation center. 124 Per his zealous advocacy of new treatment mechanisms and his
generous monetary gift, Mr. Smithers "affected a revolution in the treatment of alcoholism and
brought about the professionalization of the field. "

125

In his initial letter of intent to the hospital,

Mr. Smithers reserved significant responsibilities for himself as a donor, such as requiring that
specific project plans and staff appointments have his approval. 126 It was Smithers' fervent
intent to 1naintain an active role in the program. Interestingly, despite Mr. Smithers' wealth of

personal experience as a lifelong alcoholic, he lacked any professional qualifications in the

120
121

Rothchild, supra note 16, at 110.
I d. at 110-11.

Jd.
Roosevelt Hospital later merged with St. Luke's to become "Roosevelt/St. Luke's Hospital."
124
Mr. Smithers was not only a pioneer as a venture philanthropist, but also in his conviction that alcoholism was a
disease.
125
Goodwin, supra note 62, at 1096.
126
Smithers, 281 A.D.2d at 128.
122
123
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medical field. 127 Roosevelt Hospital nevertheless accepted the gift with its terms, and Smithers'
vision culminated in the founding of the "Smithers Center" in New York City. 128
In response to adverse economic conditions, including Medicaid budget cuts, the Hospital
began to consider making changes to its alcohol rehabilitation program. 129 Specifically, it
contemplated the sale of an Upper Eastside in-patient facility. 130 Mr. Smithers, maintaining an
active role in the management of the program, vigilantly opposed the sale of the Upper Eastside
house and contested that it was "integral to the program lmder the terms of his gift." 131 Despite
the escalating tension between Smithers and the Hospital regarding the gift's donative intent, the
house was not sold during Smithers' lifetime. 132 After Smithers' death in 1995, however, the
Hospital moved forward with its plan, and Mrs. Smithers, administratrix of her late husband's
estate, sought the help of the Attorney General to prevent the sale. 133 Dissatisfied with his
handling of the matter, Mrs. Smithers pursued judicial remedy in 2001. 134
The Smithers decision constitutes a turning point in donor-initiated litigation because, for
the first time, the traditional obstacles to donor standing were circumvented. Although the New
York Court of Appeals agreed with the· common law standard that had been adapted into state
statutory law, it nevertheless chose to raise, sua sponte, whether the attorney general's delegated
right to enforce charitable gifts was exclusive. 135

127

Goodwin, supra note 62, at 1096.
Smithers, 281 A.D.2d at 128.
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ad1ninistratrix, Mrs. Smithers, had standing consistent with that of the Attorney General to
pursue her gift enforcement claim against the defendant hospital. 136
In its analysis, the Smithers court looked to Associated Alumni of General Theological

Seminary v. General Theological Seminary, a decision rendered by the New York Appellate
Division and affirmed by the Court of Appeals in 1900. 137 In that case, various alumni of
General Theological Seminary had given ftmds to the institution for the purpose of endowing a
professorship. 138 In the gift instnunent, the ahunni attached certain conditions to the endowment,
specifically reserving a right of nomination in the event that the chair became vacant. 139 When
conflict arose between the alumni association and the institution regarding those conditions, the
alumni filed suit against the seminary. 140 The Appellate Division held that, due to the plaintiffs
retention of the right of nomination, it was entitled to standing as a donor. 141 After allowing the
alumni association standing, the court was able to address the merits of the plaintiffs claim and
determined that the seminary had indeed violated the provisions of the gift agreement. 142
Although the Court of Appeals upheld arguably the most important aspect of the
Appellate Division's n11ing in Associated Alumni regarding a donor's right to standing, it altered
the remedy of the lower court, ordering specific performance from the defendant institution
rather than monetary refund. 143 The Court of Appeals reasoned that in order for a gift to be
refunded to a donor, a right of reversion must be an express provision in the gift instrument.

144

Because such a condition was not included in the alumni association's deed of gift, merely
136

ld. at 139-40.
Jd. at 136.
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Assoc. Alumni of the Gen. Theological Seminary of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of Am.
v. Gen. Theological Seminary ofthe Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States, 163 N.Y. 417,420 (1900).
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returning the money to the donor was an improper remedy, as doing so would viliually dissolve
the trust. 145 Due to its reservation of nomination, however, the court held that the alumni
association had sufficient standing to maintain its action for the gift's enforcement. 146
In rendering the Smithers decision, the court reasoned that, although Mr. Smithers had
not retained a reversion, he nevertheless "retained a supervisory role with respect to [his] gift and
indeed had served in this supervisory role," not dissimilar from the right of nomination reserved
by the donors in Associated Alumni. 147 The court articulated that Smithers' retention of an
oversight role was therefore enough to arn1 his estate with standing to enforce the terms of his
gift. 148 Furthermore, the court justified Mrs. Smithers' right to standing by distinguishing her
from other disinterested plaintiffs the common law standard intended to shtm. Unlike those
plaintiffs who may bring "vexatious litigation" against a charity despite having no tangible stake
in the outcome, the court noted that Mrs. Smithers had played "a cn1eial role in monitoring the
Hospital in its compliance with the terms of the gift." 149 Additionally, the court observed that
Mrs. Smithers had demonstrated far greater interest and diligence in the matter of preserving her
late husband's mission than did the attorney general. 150

CONCLUSION

Relying upon the logic of the Smithers court, major donors in college sports inarguably
demonstrate special interest and dedication to the success and prosperity of their chosen
institution.

Furthermore, certain donors and boosters indeed have the qualifications and

experience to tnake educated, rational, informed decisions regarding the direction of an athletic
Jd.
I d. at 422.
147
Goodwin, supra note 62, at 1155
148
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program. Robert Burton, for example, played football both collegiately and professionally, and
may have been justified in stating that "[he is] fully qualified to assess coaches and their ability
to match up with [UConn's] needs." 151 Advocating venture philanthropy in the realm of
collegiate athletics would theoretically allow these interested parties - armed with a vision for a
program's success - to permissively buy access, influence, and power through monetary
contributions.
Irrefutably, Burton's contribution to UConn football enhanced the program. The new
facility became a cornerstone of the program, and was a catalyst for its rise to pr01ninence.
Hiring an adept, qualified coach is an equally important cornerstone in shaping the direction of a
program. Yet there remains a palpable discrepancy between the two - while we encourage and
commend major donors for the facilities they construct and the uniforms they provide, there is
something tmsavory about allowing a major donor to explicitly "buy" influence over coaching
decisions at the collegiate leve1. 152 Put differently, If the NCAA is indeed attempting to preserve
the integrity and mnateurism of college athletics, then there may be something inherently wrong
with fostering a model of venture philanthropy, and allowing boosters to reserve supervisory and
nomination rights in college athletics.
On the other hand, the watchful eye of the NCAA may serve as a sufficient restriction
allowing venture philanthropy to improve intercollegiate competition, athletic facilities, and
coaching staffs during an economic downturn when institutions need it most. The cost of staying
competitive in Division I athletics continues to rise each year.

151

Given the instability of our

Burton letter, supra note 1.
Burton never expressly stated in his letter that he believed his monetary contributions to UConn would allow him
to select the next football coach. His complaints related in large part to the lack of stewardship shown by UConn.
Though most institutions recognize the importance and value of nurturing and cultivating relationships with their
major donors, the fiduciary duty and stewardship owed to a donor upon the completion of an tmrestricted gift is
premised entirely on good faith.
152
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nation's current economic climate, colleges and tmiversities will be forced to solicit
contributions from donors in order to sustain their athletic programs and maintain a presence in
the Division I arms race.

As research on donor motivation demonstrates, there is indeed a

growing market for major donors seeking access and influence in college sports.

If

philanthropy's trend towards control continues, it is plausible that institutions may be inclined to
accept restricted gifts from major donors seeking to be consulted in athletic department decisions.
Conceptually, collegiate donors like Robert Burton are not all that different from Brink
Smithers. Each had a special interest in their respective institutions' goal, and had a vision for
how to best attain that goal. The only difference between these men is that Brink Smithers was
the only one to expressly retain the right to oversee his dollars at work. Unforttu1ately for
disgn1ntled donors like Burton, however, this is the only difference that legally matters. Until
colleges and universities become more willing to accept restricted gifts from donors seeking
influence and oversight, athletic departments and ad1ninistrative boards retain the right to leave
their donors - even multi-million dollar donors like Robert Burton - out in the cold when it
comes to decision-making.
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